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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of an appeal of a summary judgment ruling dismissing Respondent 
U.S. Bank Home Mortgage ("U.S. Bank") from a proceeding brought by Appellant homeowners 
(the "Skinners") against a general contractor and U.S. Bank. The Skinners' residence was 
destroyed by a fire. U.S. Bank's loan is secured by a first lien Deed of Trust on the residence. 
The Complaint alleges that U.S. Bank took control of insurance proceeds paid by the insurance 
carrier because of the residence fire, then negligently inspected the home under construction, and 
thereafter disbursed the insurance proceeds to the general contractor when the residence was not 
as far along as expected, resulting in an overpayment to the general contractor. The general 
contractor then walked off the job and did not complete construction of the new residence for the 
Skinners. Skinners asserted a negligence claim against U.S. Bank contending that a fiduciary 
relationship was created between the parties and that U.S. Bank breached its fiduciary duties. 
The District Court dismissed these claims on summary judgment. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On March 28, 2008, Skinners filed the subject lawsuit against Albert D. Peterson and 
Babette Peterson, doing business as PCS Company Inc., asserting a claim for breach of contract. 
R. Vol. I, p. 22-28. On October 10, 2008, Skinners amended their Complaint to add defendants, 
including U.S. Bank. R. Vol. I, p. 29-37. On March 4, 2009 the Skinners filed a Second 
Amended Complaint asserting a claim for negligence against U.S. Bank. R. Vol. I, p. 56-65. 
U.S. Bank filed an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on May 5, 2009. R. Vol. I, p. 73-
80. On February 12, 2010 U.S. Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(b). R. Vol. I, p. 102-104. On May 24, 2010, the District Court issued an 
Opinion and Order on Defendant U.S. Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Order 
granted U.S. Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal. R. Vol. II, p. 196-212. 
Skinners filed a Motion to Reconsider on June 1, 2011. R. Vol. II, p. 262-265. U.S. 
Bank filed a Response to the Motion to Reconsider on June 10, 2011. R. Vol. II, p. 266-270. On 
July 11, 2011, the District Court orally denied the Skinners' Motion to Reconsider. R. Vol. I, p. 
14. A Judgment was entered in favor of U.S. Bank Horne Mortgage on March 5, 2014. R. Vol. 
I, p. 325-326. A Notice of Appeal to this Court was filed April 9, 2014. R. Vol. II, p. 327-329. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The undisputed facts pertinent to this Appeal are largely set forth in the Affidavit of 
Sarah Johnson-Fodge filed February 12, 2010 (R. Vol. II, p. 338-384) and the Supplemental 
Affidavit of Sarah Johnson-Fodge filed March 30, 2010 (R. Vol. II, p. 173-184). 
Most unfortunately, on October 23, 2006, a fire destroyed the Skinners' home. The home 
was insured through Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Sarah Johnson-Fodge is a supervisor 
of the insurance department of U.S. Bank and handles administration of insurance proceeds 
when a residence financed by U.S. Bank is damaged or destroyed. From January 2007 through 
August 2007, Liberty Mutual issued insurance proceeds to U.S. Bank for a total of $426,556.99. 
R. Vol. II, p. 339-340. 
U.S. Bank's loan to the Skinners is secured by a first lien Deed of Trust. R. Vol. II, p. 
340; 345-359. The Deed of Trust requires that the borrower name the lender as an additional 
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insured. The Deed of Trust specifically provides: 
In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier 
and Lender. Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any 
insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance was required by 
Lender, shall be applied to restoration or repair of the Property, if the restoration 
or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. During 
such repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such 
insurance proceeds until Lender has had an opportunity to inspect such Property 
to ensure the work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided that 
such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender may disburse proceeds for 
the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series of progress payments 
as the work is completed. R. Vol. II, p. 350. Borrower shall be responsible for 
repairing or restoring the Property only if Lender has released proceeds for such 
purposes. R. Vol. II, p. 3 51. 
On October 31, 2006, U.S. Bank provided Skinners the procedures utilized in processing 
insurance claims. These procedures included use of a licensed and bonded contractor; that one-
third of the funds will be released payable to the mortgagor and contractor immediately; and that 
a second one-third draw will be released upon notification from the mortgagor that 66% of the 
repairs have been completed and an inspection has been performed to verify the status of the 
repairs. R. Vol. II, p. 340; 362. The insurance processing procedures also include an owner's 
Affidavit of Intention to Complete Repairs, which was signed by the Skinners on June 5, 2007 
and states: 
THE CLAIM PROCEEDS IN THE AMOUNT OF $358,280.97 WILL BE USED 
FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE PROPERTY. THE UNDERSIGNED 
ALSO AGREES TO INDEMNIFY AND HOLD U.S. BANK HOME 
MORTGAGE HARMLESS AGAINST ANY AND ALL CLAIMS WHICH 
MAY ARISE AS A RESULT OF FUNDS BEING PAID IN ADVANCE FOR 
THE ABOVE WORK OR CLAIM. R. Vol. II, p. 370. 
On June 18, 2007, U.S. Bank advanced Skinners the first draw for restoration of the 
repairs to the property in the amount of $119,426.99, payable jointly to Skinners and their 
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contractor, PCS, Inc. The transmittal letter from U.S. Bank explained: 
The next draw will be released once the repairs are 66% complete. Please contact 
our office to request an inspection once your repairs are to this point. The 
inspection performed is a visual inspection to confirm the work is complete; it 
does not verify that building codes are met. R. Vol. II, p. 3 72; 3 82. 
On September 5, 2007, following request by the Skinners, U.S. Bank issued a second 
draw for partial payment for damage to the property in the amount of $22,700.00 payable jointly 
to the Skinners and their contractor. R. Vol. II, p. 374; 383. 
On September 25, 2007, U.S. Bank had the Skinners' property inspected by Safeguard 
Properties, LLC, and independent contractor used by U.S. Bank for the purpose of inspecting its 
mortgage collateral, and in this instance, the Skinner residence. The inspection report reflected 
that the percentage of completion was 65% complete, that the contractor was present and that the 
mortgagor was satisfied with the work to date. R. Vol. II, p. 341 - 342. On October 4, 2007, 
U.S. Bank then issued a third draw for partial payment for damage to the property in the amount 
of$139,400.62 payable jointly to the Skinners and their contractor. R. Vol II, p 376; 384. 
U.S. Bank learned that the Skinners' contractor walked off the job November 1, 2007. R. 
Vol. II, p. 342. On November 15, 2007, U.S. Bank received a telephone call from Greg Skinner 
requesting that subcontractors that were not paid by the general contractor be paid from the 
insurance proceeds and then faxed unpaid invoices to U.S. Bank. U.S. Bank then issued checks 




Whether or not the District Court was correct in granting summary judgment dismissing 
Skinners' claim for negligence/breach of fiduciary duty against U.S. Bank. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court uses the same standard 
employed by the trial court when deciding such a motion. Kolln v. Saint Luke's Reg!. Med. Ctr., 
130 Idaho 323, 327, 940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Idaho 1997). "[I]f the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw" summary 
judgment is proper. I.R.C.P. 56(c). The burden is on the moving party to prove an absence of 
genuine issues of material fact. Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 168 (Idaho 
1997). In addition, this Court views the facts and inferences in the record in favor of the non-
moving party. Id. 
B. The relationship bchveen U.S. Bank and the Skinners is not a fiduciary relationship 
but debtor/creditor. 
Plaintiffs assert in Paragraphs XXIII through XXV of the Complaint that U.S. Bank was 
negligent in the following ways: 
• Paying insurance money to Petersons for work that was not properly done; 
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• Improperly administered the funds and owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiffs to not 
overpay the contractor. 
R. Vol. I, p. 60. 
A cause of action for common-law negligence in Idaho has four elements: (1) a duty, 
recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a 
breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting 
injury; and (4) actual loss or damage. Nation v. State, Dept. of Corrections, 144 Idaho 177, 189, 
158 P.3d 953, 965 (Idaho 2007). To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff 
must establish that defendants owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty and that the fiduciary duty was 
breached. Country Cove Development, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288, 294 
(Idaho 2006). 
Generally, the relationship between a borrower and lender is a debtor-creditor 
relationship, not a fiduciary relationship. Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 
121 Idaho 266, 277, 824 P.2d 841, 852 (Idaho 1991). Fiduciary duties may arise between 
lenders and borrowers in limited circumstances where there is "an agreement creating a duty, or 
if the lender exercises complete control over the disbursement of funds." Wooden v. First 
Security Bank of Idaho, NA. 121 Idaho 98, 100, 822 P.2d 995, 997 (Idaho 1991). This is 
consistent with federal law. As explained in Teaupa v. US. National Bank NA., 836 F.Supp.2d 
1083, 1100 (D. Hawai'i 2011): 
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Lenders generally owe no fiduciary duties to their borrowers. See, e.g., Nymark 
v. Heart Fed Sav. & LoanAss'n, [231 Cal.App.3d 1089] 283 Cal.Rptr. 53, 54 n. 1 
(Cal.App.1991) ("The relationship between a lending institution and its borrower-
client is not fiduciary in nature."); Miller v. US. Bank of Wash., [72 Wash.App. 
416] 865 P.2d 536, 543 (Wash.App.1994) ("The general rule ... is that a lender is 
not a fiduciary of its borrower."); Huntington A1ortg. Co. v. DeBrota, 703 N.E.2d 
160, 167 (Ind.App.1998) (" A lender does not owe a fiduciary duty to a borrower 
absent some special circumstances."); Spencer v. DHI Mortg. Co., 642 F.Supp.2d 
1153, 1161 (E.D.Cal.2009) ("Absent 'special circumstances' a loan transaction 'is 
at arms-length and there is no fiduciary relationship between the borrower and 
lender."') (quoting Oaks Mgmt. Corp. v. Super. Ct., [145 Cal.App.4th 453] 51 
Cal.Rptr.3d 561 (Cal.App.2006)); Ellipso, Inc. v. Mann, 541 F.Supp.2d 365, 373 
(D.D.C.2008) ("[T]he relationship between a debtor and a creditor is ordinarily a 
contractual relationship ... and is not fiduciary in nature.") ( citation omitted). 
Idaho follows these principles. As the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed in Black Canyon 
Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900, (Idaho 
1991): 
First, regarding Black Canyon's claim of "breach of fiduciary duty" against the 
bank, Black Canyon cites no Idaho cases which hold that there is a fiduciary duty 
between a bank and a customer. Our cases hold to the contrary. Peterson v. Idaho 
First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578,585,367 P.2d 284,291 (1961) ("It is generally 
stated that the relationship between a bank and its general depositor is that of 
debtor and creditor."); see also Travelers lndemn. Co. v. State, 140 Ariz. 194, 680 
P.2d 1255 (App.1984); First Bank of Wakeeney v. 1vfoden, 235 Kan. 260, 681 P.2d 
11 (1984); Deist v. Wachholz, 208 Mont. 207, 678 P.2d 188 (1984); Peters v. 
Sjoholm, 95 Wash.2d 871, 631 P.2d 937 (1981), appeal dismissed, cert. denied 
455 U.S. 914, 102 S.Ct. 1267, 71 L.Ed.2d 455 (1981); Loucks v. Albuquerque 
Nat. Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966); Ingram v. Liberty Nat. Bank & 
Trust Co. of Oklahoma City, 533 P.2d 975 (Okl.1975); Rivera v. Central Bank & 
Trust Co., 155 Colo. 383, 395 P.2d 11 (1964). Reference is made by appellant to 
Dugan v. First National Bank of Wichita, 227 Kan. 201, 606 P .2d 1009 ( 1980). 
Actually, the Dugan case is not inconsistent with our case of Peterson v. Idaho 
First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961 ). The Kansas court in 
Dugan stated, "We have been unable to locate any case in which a fiduciary 
relationship was held to arise solely through a longstanding creditor-debtor 
relationship or prior dealings between the customer and the bank." 606 P.2d at 
1015. The rule expressed in the above cases holds that the relationship in a lender-
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borrower situation 1s a debtor-creditor relationship, and not a fiduciary 
relationship. 
i. Whether U.S. Bank exercised complete control over the rebuilding funds. 
Skinners, of necessity, argue that U.S. Bank exercised "complete control over the 
rebuilding funds" and therefore established a fiduciary relationship. This is not the case. The 
relationship between Skinners and U.S. Bank is that of debtor-creditor based upon the terms of 
the Note and Deed of Trust. The applicable Idaho case law discusses "control" in the context of 
disbursing construction loan proceeds, which is substantially no different than disbursing 
insurance proceeds. 
Laight v. Idaho First Nat 'l Bank, 108 Idaho 211, 697 P .2d 1225 (Idaho 1985) is 
remarkably similar to the facts of the instant case. In Laight, a subcontractor sued Laights to 
foreclose a lien he filed against their new home when the builder failed to pay for the work. The 
Laights then brought a cross-claim against Idaho First National Bank ("IFNB") to recover for 
breach of a contractual duty to secure lien waivers from various subcontractors prior to 
disbursing the loan proceeds. The construction proceeds were disbursed in the form of cashier's 
checks made payable jointly to the Laights and the builder, with the Laights' funds disbursed 
first. The agreement required that disbursement "occur immediately upon receipt by the BANK 
of a written "Report of Expenditure" from either the OvVNER or the BUILDER." The Report of 
Expenditure was to include, among other things, receipts of payment and lien waivers from the 
subcontractors, laborers and materialmen. After construction began, IFNB made periodic 
disbursements, however failed to first obtain receipts of payment and lien waivers. After 
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construction was completed, an unpaid subcontractor initiated a lien foreclosure action, naming 
the Laights and INFB as defendants. Laights cross-claimed against the bank for negligence, 
breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. The gist of the Laights' claim was that the bank 
should have obtained lien waivers before making disbursements, and failing that, should be 
liable for any liens filed against the property. The bank then moved for summary judgment on 
the cross-claim. 
In addressing whether the bank breached its duty of care by failing to secure lien waivers 
before disbursing the loan proceeds, the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
A mortgagee is not generally obligated to protect the interests of the mortgagor 
unless the agreement requires him to do so. 59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES 298 (1949). 
The mortgagee may be obligated in the absence of an agreement if it exercises 
complete control over disbursement of the funds or if the mortgagee is the agent 
of the mortgagor. Laight at 214. ( emphasis added) 
The Court further held that the Laights did control disbursement to a significant degree 
because "The funds were periodically disbursed to the Laights (mortgagors), only at their 
request, in the form of checks payable jointly to them and to the builder. The agreement made it 
clear that the Laights had the duty to ascertain the status of the payments to the subcontractors 
before they endorsed the checks representing the loan proceeds. If the subcontractors \Vere not 
being paid, the Laights could have simply refused to endorse the checks until they were. The 
Laights thus had sufficient control to protect their interest against the possibility that the 
subcontractors were not being paid. This degree of control, coupled with the language in the 
agreement explicitly relieving IFNB of any duty with regard to liens against the property, 
precludes a finding that IFNB owed a duty of due care to the Laights." Laight at 214-215. 
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In the instant case, the contract language is contained in the Deed of Trust referenced in 
the Statement of Facts. It also noteworthy to observe that Skinners could have elected to pay off 
the mortgage debt, and the Deed of Trust would have been reconveyed as provided in the Deed 
of Trust. R. Vol. II p. 357. At the time of the August 11, 2014 Deed of Trust, the debt was 
$333,700.00, (R. Vol. II, p. 346) and the fire insurance proceeds received were $358,280.97 (R. 
Vol. II, p. 370), which was certainly ample to pay the debt in total. 
The Deed of Trust expressly gives U.S. Bank the right to hold the insurance proceeds, 
and disburse the proceeds in single or more payments when the work is completed to its 
satisfaction. Under U.S. Bank's policies and procedures, it notified Skinners that a second draw 
would be issued at the Skinner's request when the improvements were 66% complete following a 
visual inspection. Correspondence also notified Skinners that there was no inspection to 
determine compliance with code. 
There is no dispute that Skinners requested the third draw, nor is there any dispute that 
the checks issued by U.S. Bank were jointly payable to the Skinners and PCS Construction, Inc. 
As in the Laight case, Skinners could have elected to hold the check if they felt the contractor 
had not sufficiently completed the work, or if the work was substandard. Nowhere is there any 
agreement that U.S. Bank would ensure that the residence was completed in a manner consistent 
with their contract or to applicable code, or that the contractor would be solvent. The Deed of 
Trust language as well as U.S. Bank's correspondence to the Skinners makes this clear. The 
Skinners themselves had control over how they disbursed the funds to the contractor, and had the 
ability to choose not to disburse the funds to the contractor. Given the control of the Skinners 
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over the insurance proceeds, there is no fiduciary duty owing by U.S. Bank to Skinners. 
Madridv. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 751 (Idaho 2000) is also illustrative. In that case, 
the Madrids sought construction financing for their home from First Federal. First Federal 
required a construction loan agreement (CLA). Madrids selected their contractor. First Federal 
periodically disbursed funds from the loan during construction to pay for materials and 
completed labor. The disbursed checks were made payable to both the Madrids and their 
contractor. Four months following completion, four subcontractors filed lien foreclosure on the 
Madrids' home. Madrids cross claimed against First Federal for breach of contract and breach of 
fiduciary duty. Madrids and First Federal each moved for summary judgment on their claims. 
The District Court granted First Federal's motion for summary judgment and denied Madrids. 
The Court cited to Laight and held that there was no fiduciary duty owed by First Federal 
because the Madrids had cont.rol over disbursement of the loan funds; the disbursals were at their 
request, and the checks were issued jointly to the Madrids and their contractor. Madrid at 805. 
The same would be true in the instant case because the Skinners had control over disbursement 
of the insurance proceeds; the disbursals were at their request, and the checks were issued jointly 
to the Skinners and their contractor. For these reasons, the District Court correctly concluded 
that U.S. Bank did not owe Skim1ers a fiduciary duty, and therefore could not have been 
negligent. 
As Skinners correctly acknowledge in their briefing, there is no contract between the 
Skinners and U.S. Bank that creates a fiduciary duty. And, each of the cases cited by the 
Skinners are factually distinguishable. Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Executive 
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Estates, Inc. 174 Ind.App. 674, 369 N.E. 2d 1117 (Ind.App. 2 Dist. 1977) found that Prudential 
had a duty to disburse loan proceeds and protect the interest of Executive by securing releases 
from those having claims against Executive based upon a contract and prevailing custom and 
practice. Id. at 1123. In Falls Lumber Co. v. Herman, 114 Ohio App.262, 181 N.E. 2d 713 
(Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1961) the Court found a duty and breach because the lender paid money 
directly to the construction company without complying with Ohio mechanics lien law. 
Bollinger v. Livingston State Bank and Trust Company, 187 So.2d 784 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1966) 
involved a lender inspecting construction for quantity and quality, and disbursing construction 
funds directly to the contractor without approval by the owner, apparently contrary to the note 
and building contract. Cook v. Citizens Savings & Loan Association, 346 So.2d 370 (Miss. 
1977) involved a reverse situation, and the Court held that the lender had a duty to pay the 
borrower's loan proceeds to the contractor instead of issuing the loan proceeds to the borrower 
without ensuring the borrower would use the proceeds to pay the contractor. A1.S.Jvf 
Corporation v. Kuntson Company, 283 Minn. 527, 167 N.W.2d 66 (Miss. 1969) involved facts 
where the construction lender used mortgage proceeds to satisfy unrelated obligations owed to 
the lender. None of these cases cited by Skinners involve facts that are similar to those at issue 
in this appeal. 
Skinners suggest that the language of the Deed of Trust that gives the lender the right to 
hold insurance proceeds during construction resulted in "U.S. Bank protecting their interest at 
the expense of the Skinners." This is not the case. As described by the Sixth Circuit in Layne v. 
Bank One, Kentucky, NA., 395 F.3d 271,281 (6th Cir. 2005): 
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[B]anks do not generally have fiduciary relationship with their debtors. This 
flows from the nature of the creditor-debtor relationship. As a matter of business, 
banks seek to maximize their earnings by charging interest rates or fees as high as 
the market will allow. Banks seek as much security for their loans as they can 
obtain. In contrast, debtors hope to pay the lowest possible interest rate and fee 
charges and give as little security as possible. Without a great deal more, a mere 
confidence that a bank will act fairly does not create a fiduciary relationship 
obligating the bank to act in the borrower's interest ahead of its own interest. As 
one court noted, "it would be absurd to think that [a bank] could never take its 
own interests into account, or that [the borrowers'] interest had to be absolutely 
paramount at all times and in all situations. 
Even if the Skinners could establish that U.S. Bank's inspection was for their benefit, 
which it was not, no fiduciary duty would arise. In Alpine Bank v. Hubbell, 506 F.Supp.2d 388, 
407 (D.Colo. 2007), the Defendants asserted that the Bank's alleged representations that it 
would oversee a project by performing inspections and controlling disbursement of funds 
established a fiduciary relationship between the parties. The Court, however disagreed, holding 
"Plaintiffs alleged statements that it would inspect and monitor the Project's progress and 
control the disbursements are all activities "within in the normal course of business" between a 
construction loan borrower and a lending institution and, therefore do not constitute "special 
circumstances" establishing a fiduciary or confidential relationship, citing Torke v. Fed. Deposit 
Ins. Corp., 761 F.Supp, 754, 754-58 (D.Colo. 1991). 
To the extent that Skinners argue that a trust was created when the insurance proceeds 
were issued to U.S. Bank for the benefit of Skinners and thereby establishing a fiduciary 
relationship (R. Vol. I, p. 136), this argument would also fail. As held in the Alpine Bank case, 
the creation of an express trust requires that the settlor declare an intention to create a trust. The 
Court also noted that the loan was not for the sole benefit of the borrower, but was also intended 
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to benefit the lender and therefore no trust was intended. Supra at 408. 
The record and case law demonstrated that, contrary to Skinners' assertion, U.S. Bank 
did not exercise "complete control over the disbursement of funds which creates a fiduciary 
duty." As in Laight and Madrid, checks were issued jointly payable to the Skinners and their 
contractor PCS. This gave Skinners sufficient control to determine whether or not they endorsed 
the proceeds to the contractor. Moreover, even after the contractor walked off the job, the 
Skinners were permitted and did request funds for payment to unpaid suppliers and materialmen, 
demonstrating that Skinners themselves exercised control in the disbursement of the insurance 
proceeds. 
ii. Skinners executed the "Affidavit of Intention to Complete Repairs" because 
they elected to rebuild at the insistence of their insurance company. 
The Affidavit of Intention to Complete Repairs is signed by the Skinners and provides: 
THE UNDERSIGNED ALSO AGREES TO INDEMNIFY AND HOLD U.S. 
BANK HOME MORTGAGE HARMLESS AGAINST ANY AND ALL 
CLAIMS WHICH MAY ARISE AS A RESULT OF FUNDS BEING PAID IN 
ADVANCE FOR THE ABOVE WORK OR CLAIM. R. Vol. II. p. 370. 
To put this clause in context, a brief review of facts in the record demonstrates that U.S. 
Bank advanced $119,426.99 on June 16, 2007 to the Skinners and PCS Company Inc. before any 
construction began on the Skinners' home. Skinners also allege that they paid the contractor a ten 
percent down payment of $43,614.61 on June 12, 2006. R. Vol. I, p. 58. Skinners also spent 
$40,000 for a Turf Shed (temporary housing) which enhanced U.S. Bank's collateral. R. Vol. II, 
p. 380. Skinners specifically allege that the contractor "failed to properly construct the footing 
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drains and seal the basement floor. R. Vol. I, p. 58. Clearly, the negligent construction 
complained of occurred during the time frame where the contractor had been advanced a total of 
$163,041.60, before any inspection occurred. 
Mr. Skinner recapped the problems in a chronology letter dated August 22, 2008. R. Vol. I, 
p. 378-380. Points made by Mr. Skinner include: 
• Insurance company insisted on replacing what we [Skinners] had, although bids to 
do so came in $100,000 over the policy amount ( evidently we were undersinsured). 
In Mid-July 2007 new foundation for the rebuild began. 
• July through October 2007 the contractor whined about needing more money until 
we [Skinners] called the bank and got an inspection that approved payment of the second 
1/3 draw. 
• In November 2007, Mr. Skinner discovered the maJor water problem in the 
downstairs section and found out the contractor had not installed foundation drains nor 
had he sealed the walls before backfilling. 
• Liberty Mutual was holding a residual that might cause a fight because Skinner's 
didn't "replace" what they lost. 
Skinners were aware that U.S. Bank's inspection was a visual inspection only and did not 
verify that building codes were met. R. Vol. II, p. 3 72. The record reflects that indeed the 
Skinners were well informed as to contractor and insurance problems before they requested the 
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second progress draw and were in a position to put the brakes on the construction if they were 
not satisfied with the progress. They did not do so, and U.S. Bank honored their payment 
requests. 
The Georgia Court of Appeals has held: "Ordinarily, an action for damages by a property 
owner against a lender for negligent inspection will not lie, because the lender's inspection is 
normally not made for the owner's benefit, but the lender's protection and benefit." 
lvfustagueem-Graydon v. Suntrust Bank, 573 S.E. 2d 455, 460, 258 Ga.App. 200, 206 
(Ga.App.2002). Here, the "exculpatory clause" as argued by the Skinners is a recognition that 
U.S. Bank is paying out money in advance for work that has not been completed, and certainly 
not inspected. There is risk associated with that function, and indemnification for that risk is 
properly placed on the borrower. Even though a visual inspection was later conducted, the 
inspection was for the benefit of U.S. Bank and not the Skinners. The "exculpatory" clause 
simply puts the risk of payment for construction in advance of the work squarely and properly on 
the Skinners. Moreover, Skinners were aware that they were to contact U.S. Bank to request a 
draw where their repairs were 66% complete (R. Vol. II, p 3 72), and indeed the Skinners 
themselves did make such a request. R. Vol. II, p. 379. Skinners had no right to rely on the 
inspection that U.S. Bank obtained from Safeguard Properties for its benefit. As a consequence, 
the language of the exculpatory clause or the parties' respective bargaining power is not relevant 
because the Skinners had no right to rely on the inspection in the first instance. 
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C. U.S. Bank has no duty to sue Safeguard Properties, LLC. 
Skinners argue "U.S. Bank has a duty and is obligated to bring suit [against Safeguard], 
yet state that "The District Court correctly found there is no case law requiring U.S. Bank to sue 
Safeguard." Appellant's Brief p. 18-19. Indeed, Skinners sued Safeguard Properties LLC as set 
forth in the Third Amended Complaint filed June 28, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 9. Safeguard Properties 
LLC moved for Summary Judgment of Dismissal on February 10, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 11. The 
Court granted Safeguard Properties LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal on July 
11, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 14. If Skinners believed that they had a claim against Safeguard 
Properties, LLC and Karen Smith, they could have appealed the District Court's dismissal of 
Safeguard Properties LLC as a party. 
Notably, the only Affidavit of Plaintiffs in the record in opposition to U.S. Bank's 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal is that of Greg Skinner dated April 8, 2010. R. Vol. 
I, p. 193-194. The Skinner Affidavit provides no testimony that the Safeguard Properties LLC's 
inspection was for their benefit, or that the Skinner's were unsophisticated or that they relied on 
U.S. Bank. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm that the District Court was correct m granting summary 
judgment dismissing Skinners claim for negligence against U.S. Bank for breach of fiduciary 
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